

Secret

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

DIA review(s) completed.

Secret
51

25 July 1968

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700070001-4

Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700070001-4

~~SECRET~~No. 0217/68
25 July 1968

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Czechoslovakia-USSR: Top level meeting still shrouded in secrecy. (Page 2)

Turkey: Student demonstrations have resumed. (Page 3)

25X1

Congo (Brazzaville): President's offer to quit is an attempt to consolidate his position. (Page 6)

India: Extremists may be making some progress toward forming a new "Revolutionary Communist Party." (Page 7)

Cuba: Shift of interior minister may mean move by Castro to gain more control over security apparatus. (Page 8)


25X6

USSR-Egypt: Amphibious landing demonstrations (Page 10)

Israel-Algeria: Hijacked airliner (Page 10)

Rumania: Oil-swap deal (Page 10)

~~SECRET~~



91499 7-68 CIA

SECRET

[South Vietnam: The ground war in South Vietnam continues to reflect a slightly stepped up pace.

Several sharp small-unit engagements have been reported in each of the country's four corps areas in the past two days. In addition, Communist forces unleashed a heavy mortar bombardment against Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, where a multi-regimental enemy troop buildup has been in progress for several weeks. Allied facilities at Da Nang and Hoi An also came under enemy rocket and mortar attacks.

25X1 [redacted] the Communists may be preparing for limited ground attacks against Hue and several nearby district towns, possibly during late July or early August. [redacted]

25X1

Czechoslovakia-USSR: Official silence shrouds the top level Soviet-Czechoslovak meeting.

Neither side has acknowledged that the meeting is under way and so far no evidence is available that it has in fact begun. All members of the Soviet politburo have been out of sight since 22 July, however, and the Czechoslovak presidium dropped out of public view on 23 July. Czechoslovak sources have generally hinted that the meeting has not yet begun, but this may be an attempt at concealment. Moscow probably insisted on tight security precautions, and this time the Czechoslovaks appear to be complying.

The news media of both countries are still exchanging verbal blows. Radio Moscow has ridiculed US denials of intervention in the Czechoslovak situation, and repeated earlier allegations that the US, in concert with West Germany, is seeking to split the Communist countries.

A Czechoslovak party spokesman admitted yesterday that some Soviet units remain in Czechoslovakia. He added, according to one press account, that they "will remain until a communiqué is published." The Czechoslovak military attaché in Poland told his American counterpart on 23 July that some 5,000 to 6,000 troops remained.

No further details on the extent and activity of the USSR's large rear-services exercise have been received.

With the exception of East Germany, no Eastern European country appears to favor Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav counselor in Warsaw reports that the Polish leadership is adamantly opposed to military intervention, while the Turkish foreign minister has said that visiting Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter told him that the Hungarian Government opposes armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. [redacted]

25X1

25 Jul 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

SECRET

Turkey: Student demonstrations, sparked by the death of a student beaten by police on 17 July, have resumed in Istanbul.

About 30 members of a student delegation were arrested as they tried to place a black wreath inscribed "Murderers" at the door of the Istanbul governor's office. University representatives have vowed to organize further protest marches against "police brutality."

Although there is probably sympathy for the family of the dead student, public sentiment appears to be hardening against the leftist demonstrators. A night of violence followed a rightist counterdemonstration against an anti-US rally in Konya, in central Turkey.

The Turkish military establishment, which was aligned with the radical students in the 1960 coup against the rightist Menderes government, is reportedly angered and humiliated by the recent leftist attacks on US Navy personnel visiting Istanbul. Even junior officers who formerly expressed sympathy for the student protest movement are now said to be hostile.

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

~~SECRET~~

Congo (Brazzaville): Massamba-Debat's offer on 22 July to vacate the presidency is probably an attempt to consolidate his position against potential leftist opposition and to gain broad popular support.

In a nationwide radiobroadcast, the President said he would turn over his position to anyone more capable who presented himself with the approval of the people before noon 27 July. He attributed his offer to the desire to spare his countrymen the bloodshed that accompanies the taking of power by force.

Despite his reference to a possible coup, there is little evidence to suggest that Massamba-Debat is imminently threatened. There have been rumblings of discontent, particularly from Cuban and Chinese Communist-supported leftist elements who lost influence in a January government reorganization, but such rumblings are endemic in the nation's political system.

The relatively moderate President, who has remained in power by carefully manipulating the opposing factions, may again sense opposition maneuvering in the wings. His latest move may be an attempt to ward off a potential leftist power play before elections which should take place at the end of the year.

A rectangular redacted area consisting of several horizontal lines of black space.

25X1

25 Jul 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

6

SECRET

India: Extremists from the radical left Communist Party (CPI/L) appear to be making some progress toward forming a new "Revolutionary Communist Party," although formidable barriers still exist.

In Andhra Pradesh, extremists expelled from the CPI/L in mid-June have moved to form a new party around the nucleus of their sizable splinter group. They have planned two months of intensive recruiting, to be followed by a state convention formally inaugurating the party. A coordination committee has been set up to contact extremist factions in other states. In Kerala, where the CPI/L dominates the state's coalition government, party leaders have been feverishly trying to contain the growing extremist movement but may be losing ground.

Formidable barriers, however, still block the way to the formation of a viable new national Communist party to compete with the 70,000-member CPI/L and the long-established 55,000-member pro-Moscow Communist Party (CPI/R). Outside of Andhra, the extremists are probably strongest in West Bengal, where the movement began about a year ago. The Bengalis, however, favor an even more radical brand of Maoist ideology, advocating immediate armed struggle and total rejection of the parliamentary path to power. The less doctrinaire and more opportunistic Andhra group seems unlikely to subordinate itself to the Bengali leadership, which until now has dominated the move toward a third party. Both factions are already jockeying for position to control the proposed new party. [redacted]

25X1

Cuba: The reassignment of Interior Minister Ramiro Valdez may be an attempt by Fidel Castro to gain greater personal control over the Cuban security apparatus.

Havana Radio announced on 24 July that Valdez will take an "advanced military course," and that he will be "replaced" by Sergio del Valle. Valdez is a member of the eight-man politburo of the Cuban Communist Party, and a long-time intimate colleague of Castro. It is not clear, however, whether Valdez has been permanently replaced or will resume his post after completing the course.

Valle, also a member of the politburo, has been a deputy of Raul Castro in the Armed Forces Ministry, and has not had direct experience in security affairs.

Castro has been concerned with the increasing acts of overt opposition to the regime since new austerity measures were imposed in March. Last month it was officially admitted that sabotage was the cause of the destruction of an Oriente feed factory. Refugee sources have also claimed that fires at several other plants and at Cuba's principal oil refinery were acts of sabotage.

Castro may also be concerned about his own safety. A number of assassination plots have been reported in recent months. [redacted]

25X1

25X6

Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700070001-4

Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700070001-4

NOTES

USSR-Egypt: In mid-July Soviet naval units operating in the Mediterranean near Alexandria conducted two demonstrations of amphibious landings. Three Soviet amphibious ships and two destroyers probably participated in the show, which was put on for senior Egyptian officers. Although Soviet amphibious ships have operated in the eastern Mediterranean almost continuously since the Arab-Israeli war, this is the first time they have been detected conducting landings.

25X1

* * * *

Israel-Algeria: Israel probably will try for a short time to use political pressure to recover its hijacked airliner and Israeli passengers before carrying out a retaliatory action against either Algeria or Egypt. Tel Aviv already has blamed Cairo for the hijacking, on the grounds that Egypt supports Arab terrorism. Competition among the various terrorist groups may well spark even more spectacular attempts to hijack or blow up Israeli airliners or to bomb Israeli diplomatic installations. The Arab governments exert almost no control over actions by most members of these groups.

25X1

* * * *

Rumania: Bucharest has proposed to swap oil with a US international oil company in order to avoid the cost of transporting Saudi Arabian crude oil around Africa. The Rumanians this year want to exchange 300,000 tons of Saudi crude, for which they have already contracted, for the same quantity of US-controlled oil to be delivered from Mediterranean ports to Rumania; next year they would like to increase exchange to 1.1 million tons. This arrangement is similar to recent oil-swap deals which Moscow arranged with Western oil companies in order to offset increased transport costs for delivery of Soviet oil east of Suez after the closure of the Suez Canal.

25X1

25 Jul 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

10

SECRET

Secret Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011700070001-4

Secret